The Schools Versus the Long Hairs: An Exercise in Legal Gobbledygook by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1971 Issue 1 
January 1971 
The Schools Versus the Long Hairs: An Exercise in Legal 
Gobbledygook 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
The Schools Versus the Long Hairs: An Exercise in Legal Gobbledygook, 1971 WASH. U. L. Q. 89 (1971). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss1/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
THE SCHOOLS VERSUS THE LONG HAIRS: AN
EXERCISE IN LEGAL GOBBLEDYGOOK
Few issues currently being adjudicated before the federal courts
produce as directly conflicting results as those involving the public
school's power to regulate the personal appearance of its students. This
inconsistency of precedent places a heavy burden upon students and
school administrators, who must conduct themselves according to what
courts determine to be the proper limits of school regulation and of the
individual's right to dress and groom as he pleases. An equal burden is
borne by attorneys confronted with the standard "long hair" situation.
This note presents a survey of the federal litigation arising out of the
conflict between the schools and the long hairs.' It'will focus on the few
1. The cases surveyed include: Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex.
1966) [Dec. 9], affd, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968) (Held: School);
Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967) [June 13], affd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Held: School); Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967) [June 30] (Held: Student);
Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969) [Feb. 20], affd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1969) (Held: Student); Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ala.
1969) [May 9] (Held: Student); Crews v. Clones, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969) [Sept. 17]
(Held: School); Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969) [Sept. 23], affd, 424 F.2d
1281 (1st Cir. 1970) (Held: Student); Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776 (W.D.
Mo. 1969) [Sept. 25] (Held: School); Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. I1l. 1969) [Sept. 25]
(Held: Student); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969) [Oct. 9] (Held: Student); Brick
v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Colo. 1969) [Nov. 7] (Held: School); Stevenson v.
Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969) [Nov. 17], aff d, 426 F.2d 1154
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 355 (1970) (Held: School); Calbillo v. San Jacinto
Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969) [Nov. 17] (Held: Student); Sims v. Colfax
Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970) [Jan. 16] (Held: Student); Pritchard
v. Spring Branch Ind. School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Tex. 1970) [Jan. 22] (Held: School);
Wood v. Alamo Heights Ind. School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1970) [Jan. 27] (Held:
School); Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970) [Feb. 16] (Held: Student); Newhaus v.
Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1970) [Mar. 10] (Held: School); Schwartz v. Galveston Ind.
School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970) [Mar. 10] (Held: School); Reichenberg v.
Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970) [Mar. 10] (Held: Student); Lovelace v. Leechburg Area
School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1970) [Mar. 17] (Held: Student); Farrell v. Smith, 310
F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Me. 1970) [March 18] (Held: School); Brownlee v. Bradley County, Tennessee
Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) [April 10] (Held: School); Gfell v. Rickleman,
313 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ohio 1970) [April 28] (Held: School); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp.
411 (D. Vt. 1970) [May 5] (Held: Student); Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Ark.
1970) [May 8] (Held: School); Christmas v. El Reno Bd. of Educ., Ind. School Dist. No. 34,313 F.
Supp. 618 (W.D. Okla. 1970) [June 4] (Held: School); Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1
(N.D. 111. 1970) [June 9] (Held: School); Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal.
1970) [June 12] (Held: Student); and Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 91
S.Ct. 55 (1970) (Held: School). Case order determined by trial date.
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similarities or trends which can be gleaned from the fact patterns, the
purposes for which the school grooming codes were adopted, and legal
issues which were raised by the litigants.
Although as one judge put it, "each case must be decided upon its
own particular facts, ' 2 there is little in the way of significant factual
difference among the cases. The most common controversy features a
high school student 3 who has been suspended4 from school because the
length or style of his hair 5 was in violation of a written dress code., The
student wears his hair long because he likes it that way,7 and the Board
2. Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732, 738 (D. Me. 1970) (Gignoux, J.). This standard was clearly
set by the appellate court decision in Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir.
1968), where Judge Gewin said: "The decided cases clearly demonstrate that each case must be
decided in its own particular setting and factual background and within the context of the entire
record before the court in determining whether the rule or the action about which the complaint is
made is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or discriminatory. .. .
3. Of the thirty cases utilized for this analysis, twenty-six involved high school students. The non-
high school cases were: Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Me. 1970) (post-high school
technical institute); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970) (State College);
Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (Public Junior College);
Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967) (Public Junior College). The arguments
made on each side do not differ from those made where a high school student is involved. The last
three held for the student, while Farrell held for the school. Farrell determined that the school's
interest in students' employment opportunities was reasonable and the regulation was directly re-
lated to that end. See also King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 425 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1970).
4. Students were refused admission in Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. I11. 1969); Crews v.
Clones, 303 F.Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969);
Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966). This distinction has not been
used as a basis for decision, nor does it justify distinguishing cases. But see Giangreco v. Center
School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776, 780 (W.D. Mo. 1969), where a student was denied admission rather
than admitted and then expelled or suspended; therefore, procedural due process requirements are
not as rigid.
5. Cf. Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970) (mustache, heard and hair); Alexander v.
Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (sideburns); Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D.
Conn. 1970) (mustache and sideburns); Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Me. 1970)
(mustache and beard as well as hair); Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579
(W.D. Pa. 1970) (mustache); Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga.
1969) (mustache and beard); Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Mo. 1969)
(beard and hair); Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (beard).
In one case, a girl was suspended because her bangs came below her eyebrows. Sim v. Colfax
Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa. 1970).
6. There was no written regulation in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp.
545 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969); or Stevenson v.
Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969). In the appellate decision of
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1282 (Ist Cir. 1970), Judge Coffin determined the absence of
a written regulation to be immaterial and said ". . . we would not wish to see school officials
unable to take appropriate action in facing a problem of discipline or distraction simply because
there was no preexisting rule on the books." He affirmed the District Court holding for the student.
7. Students frequently supplement this reason with additional purposes related to a form of
expression, i.e., expression of individuality, rejection of older generation's values, and as anhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss1/3
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promulgated the code because non-conforming hair styles might tend to
disrupt the normal and orderly operation of the school.8 The student has
no financial need for wearing his hair long;' his parents don't like it, but
accede to his wishes because they believe he has a right to wear his hair
the way he wants to;"0 and his unusual appearance has not created any
disruption in the school, nor has it endangered anyone's health.", The
expression of self. See, e.g., Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389, 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1970);
Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F.
Supp. 706,709 (D. Minn. 1969).
8. This is the primary purpose for regulation in almost every instance. Some schools have offered
supplementary purposes. See Brownlee v. Bradley County, Tennessee Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp.
1360, 1366 (E. D. Tenn. 1970); Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (D. Me. 1970); Wesley v. Rossi,
305 F. Supp. 706, 711 (D. Minn. 1969). See also note 24 infra and accompanying text.
9. In three cases the students were members of local bands and claimed that long hair was
necessary to maintain their image. This was a primary issue in Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist.,
261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), affd, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968),
because the students' agent used the expulsion incident as a promotion gimmick. The appellate
court said:
* . ' The action taken by the school authorities does not, in our view, interfere with
appellants' right to continue in their chosen occupation of professional rock and roll
musicians. It is common knowledge that many performers are required to use special attire
and makeup, including wigs or hairpieces, for their public appearances. At this stage in
appellants' lives school may be more important than their commercial activities. In any
event, we do not feel that their business activity is eliminated, as a practical matter because
of the school's rules and regulations.
392 F.2d at 704. Immediately after the boys were denied admittance thty walked out of the school
and held a press conference which had been arranged by their "agent". They then proceeded directly
to a local recording studio and recorded a song describing the incident which was distributed to the
local radio stations. The court held for the school as did the court in Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d
213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 55 (1970). This factor aided the junior college student in
Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967). See also Leonard v. School Committee of
Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965) (one of the first state court decisions).
10. The two sets of parents involved in Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Ill.
1970) received a reprimand from the judge:
Although parents of both boys oppose the long hair style affected by their sons, they
apparently find it easier to acquiesce rather than discipline them in this matter. The parents
thus pass on their responsibility to the school and community as too many parents are doing
in this permissive age, and the parents thereby contribute to the lack of discipline and
lawlessness among the youth of our country.
11. In Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969), the court indicates that
"considerable testimony" was presented by defendants that "long hair on boys created class
disruption and discipline problems," and that "there were health and safety hazards involved in
physical education classes." Id. at 1373. Later the court found ". . . that plaintiff's appearance
directly caused disturbances and disruption of the educational process, both in the academic
classroom and during physical education classes." Id. at 1375-76. No specific instances were cited.
This was the sole basis for distinguishing away Breen v. Kahi, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wisc. 1969)
and Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ala. 1969). Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F.
Supp. 776 (W.D. Mo. 1969); Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Colo. 1969) also used
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code is a general school policy, 2 developed by a committee of parents,
teachers, students and administrators; 13 and was not designed to apply to
a particular student or any class of students in an arbitrary or capricious
manner. "
Discrepancies from this general factual situation are usually
immaterial except when a disruption or disturbance has in fact occurred
as a result of the student's long hair. 5 In these cases, when the school can
show that prevention of disruption in the classroom and campus is the
primary purpose behind the code, and that a disturbance has occurred as
a result of the long hair, precedent strongly supports upholding the
regulation." This is true even when the disturbance is caused by other
students responding to plaintiff whose only irregular act was letting his
hair grow. 17 The difficulty for the schools is proving a causal relationship
between the hair and the disturbance. Only three of the thirty cases
disruptive incidents as a basis for upholding the school's regulation. But see Sims v. Colfax
Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970) (eye observation in typing class).
12. Two cases dealt with grooming regulations for participation in athletic events and were not a
part of general school policy. Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (held for the
school); Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 414 n. I (D. Vt. 1970) (held for the student) where
the court said: "It is to be noted that under the existing athletic code, Billy Kidd, the world famous
skier, would be unable to make the ski team. Joe Pepitone and Ken Harrelson, two colorful and
popular major league ball players, would be unable to make the baseball team. Joe Namath would
be barred from the football team and Ron Hill who won the Boston Marathon on April 19 of this
year would not even be permitted to try out for the track team." Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F. Supp.
811 (E.D. Ark. 1970) found a hair regulation for students playing in the school band to be valid.
13. See Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970); Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F.
Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970). The fact that students had a role in drafting the regulation appears to
have been a significant factor in only one decision. Wood v. Alamo Heights Ind. School Dist.,
308 F. Supp. 551,552 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
14. Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1970), upheld the
school's regulation as reasonable but found its application to plaintiff arbitrary. ". . . [T]hough we
find the Leechburg regulation reasonable and valid, we are not persuaded of its reasonableness as
applied to plaintiff. His mustache is de minimis and practically imperceptible. It is merely a natural
growth, not a cultivated adornment. We do not believe that plaintiff has violated the code. To
exclude him from school for such a non-violation is arbitrary, and a violation of due process." Id. at
588.
15. The degree to which the relationship between long hair and disturbance must be established
requires something more than an analysis of the cases to ascertain. See note I I supra.
16. The disruption factor in these cases is very similar to the disruption factor in the "freedom
button" cases where the same court speaking through the same judge in back to back decisions on
the same issue upheld the students' right in Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) and
upheld the school's regulation in Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th
Cir. 1966) because there were disturbances related to the buttons. Several of the "hair" courts have
indicated that if there had been a disturbance created by the "long hair", the regulation would be
justified. See. e.g.. Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969).
17. See Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776, 779 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss1/3
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surveyed found that a related disruption occurred. 8 The result is that the
presence of actual disruption is a significant factor favoring the school
but the relationship must be established in the face of the total absence of
any logical relationship.19
Other distinguishing factors become relevant when the purpose of the
regulation is something other than preventing disruption. It is clear that
if the regulation is designed to protect the health or safety of school
citizens, it will be upheld. 20 In one instance, community "aesthetic"
standards were considered a valid purpose to which the grooming
regulation reasonably applied, particularly "[I]n these days of growing
environmental concern."2" Safeguarding students' future employment
opportunities has been found to be a valid purpose for regulating
appearance. 22 Generally, where the regulation was promulgated for some
purpose other than "... undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
18. See note 11 supra.
19. The argument favoring the regulation in these situations is not dissimilar to that found in the
line of cases beginning with Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), where the Court held that
police could restrict an individual's right to free speech if his actions and speech were likely to invite
riotous behavior in others and place the speaker in jeopardy. An individual's hair length is unlikely
to invite a riot but it is always easier for school authorities to remove the innocent source of the
problem than to protect it from many culprits. In one case the court notes that the principal
conceded that it was the boys who were picking on the plaintiff that should have been disciplined.
Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94, 98 (N.D. I11. 1969).
20. No regulation has been challenged that has been designed for health purposes alone and
"health and safety" has generally not been effective where preventing disruption has been the
regulation's aim. See, e.g., Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969) where the argument
was raised but did not play an important role in the decision, and Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702,
704 (W.D. Wisc. 1969), where Judge Doyle said: "The record contains no suggestion that the length
of the hair constituted a health problem or physical obstruction or danger to any person; I find that
it did not." In the cases involving athletic regulations the health argument was not even discussed.
See note 12 supra.
21. Brownlee v. Bradley County, Tennessee Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (E.D. Tenn.
1970). The judge reasoned: While at one time aesthetics was not considered a valid ground for
regulation, "aesthetic considerations have increasingly come to be recognized as a proper basis for
regulation .. " He then referred to such examples as zoning regulations, appearance of junk
yards, signs and billboards along interstate highways and the use and maintenance of residential
property as based on aesthetics. "A sense of orderliness, a sense of propriety, and a sense of beauty
are distinguishing characteristics of the human species. While not always explainable in terms of
concrete reason, these matters are facts of human life. They form the basis of the concept commonly
referred to as aesthetics. In these days of growing environmental concern any court denying that
aesthetic considerations may form the basis for public regulation would doubtless find itself
swimming against the current in very murky legal waters." Id. at 1366-67. Based on these
"aesthetic" considerations the court concluded that "the regulation of hair length on male students
at Bradley Central High School was neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor was it devoid of reason."
Id. at 1367.
22. Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Me. 1970). See note 3 supra.
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disturbance ' 2 3 it was usually upheld if any reasonable relationship
between means and end can be shown. But even where the regulation's
sole purpose is prevention of disruption, some cases have held it to be
nonetheless valid. 24
A good example of the serious difficulty judges have in dealing with
almost identical fact patterns can be found in a comparison of Miller v.
Gillis25 and Livingston v. SwanquistP from the Northern District of
Illinois. Miller was decided first2 and placed great reliance on Breen v.
Kahl,?8 though the court reached its decision on different grounds. The
court held that the regulation, designed to prevent disruption, violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it was
"incapable of meeting the need to which the regulation was directed,"'
and it "creates an arbitrary class of those few people who wish to wear
their hair in a manner differing from the masses-arbitrary in that the
regulation makes the acquisition of all education depend upon the length
of one's hair."'
Livingston, on the same basic facts, with a similar regulation
23. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1968).
24. See Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. I (N.D. Ill. 1970); Gfell v. Rickleman, 313 F.
Supp. 364 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Pritchard v. Spring Branch Ind. School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.
Tex. 1970); Wood v. Alamo Heights Ind. School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1970);
Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969), affd, 426 F.2d 1154
(5th Cir.), cert. denied. 91 S. Ct. 355 (1970); Davis v. Firment, 296 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967),
affd. 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969); Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D.
Tex. 1966), affd. 393 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968). Each of these cases
upheld the school's regulation even though it was promulgated for the purpose of preventing
disruption.
25. 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. 111. 1969) (Parsons, J.).
26. 314 F. Supp. I (N.D. 111. 1970) (Perry, J.).
27. Miller was decided on September 25, 1969 and Livingston was decided on June 9, 1970. The
cases were reported in the reverse order with Livingston in volume 314 and Miller in 315 of the
Federal Supplement.
28. 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969). See Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94, 99, 100 (N.D. Ill,
1969).
29. 315 F. Supp. at 100 where the court says:
A regulation promulgated under the authority of a state violates the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment if it falls within one of [sic] more of the following four
categories:
(1) The regulation is not necessary to the exercise of the inherent police powers of the state
to provide for the health, education and general welfare of the people of that state;
(2) The regulation once promulgated is incapable of meeting the need to which the
regulation is directed;
(3) The regulation creates, by its enforcement, an evil greater than that evil sought to be
corrected; and
(4) The regulation is arbitrary in defining a class of people to which it applies.
30. Id. at 101.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss1/3
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designed for the same purpose, came to the opposite conclusion and said:
"In this court's opinion defendants have established that violations of
the school's dress code can be disruptive and can adversely affect
discipline and decorum in the classroom. ' 31 Neither court found any
disruptions that were directly related to the length of plaintiff's hair 32
and there is no indication that the evidence or testimony on this point
was more impressive or credible in Livingston than in Miller.3 The task
of distinguishing the two cases fell upon the judge in Livingston who
said: "A careful reading of that case [Miller] reveals that Judge Parsons
was concerned with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as it applied to students" at the school plaintiff attended.
"The record showed that several male teachers at the school were in
violation of the school's dress regulations and that the Barrington dress
code required different treatment of the student from his teacher, which
was clearly unreasonable and violated the equal protection clause."u
The Miller code5 did not require different treatment of student and
teacher, and the discussion of the long haired teachers was used to
exemplify the arbitrariness of a rule designed to prevent disruption when
teachers, without administrative restraint, as well as plaintiff students,
31. Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. I11. 1970).
32. There apparently was a difference in the kind of minor plaintiffs involved in the two cases or
at least a difference in the judge's perception of them. In Livingston the court said:
From all of the evidence and its observation of minor plaintiffs' attitudes, the court finds and
concludes Jack Livingston and Tim Hellberg are not interested in attending school. Once
readmitted under the agreement, they were truant. They do not want to go to school.
314 F. Supp. at 6. Compare Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. at 95:
It must be made clear from the outset that this is not a case involving a revolutionary type
young man, who by bizarre attire, filth of body and clothes, obscene language and
subversive-like organizational activity, seeks to wage war against the established institutions
of the community or nation. It is not a case involving youth commonly referred to as
"beatnik" or "hippies" or "yippies". It is simply a case of a seventeen year old boy wearing
hair substantially longer than that permitted by the school's regulations.
33. Livingston pointed out that defendants had produced four "expert" witnesses who claimed
that there was a "direct correlation between dress and grooming and good behavior, discipline and a
teaching climate in the classroom." Plaintiff, evidently, produced no testimony to refute this. 314 F.
Supp. at 6. Compare Miller, where the court said: "'The School Board and its lawyers, having
exhaustively argued and extensively briefed this point, have failed to show that the dress code, in its
present form, is necessary to prevent disruptive incidents in the school." 315 F. Supp. at 101.
34. 314 F. Supp. at 9.
35. 315 F. Supp. at 97:
IV. Hair
A. Hair should always appear clean and neat, tapered up the back of the neck, and
not protruding over the ears or the eyebrows.
1. Students must be clean-shaven and sideburns should not extend lower than
the earlobes.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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wore their hair beyond the limits of the code and no disruption
occurred.3" The difference in treatment of students and teachers was not
the basis for the decision and the arguments presented give no indication
that Judge Parsons should be any more concerned about equal
protection than should Judge Perry. 37
Besides the precariousness of relying on factual distinctions, the
attorney can find little guidance in an analysis of the legal issues and
judicial reasoning. Once in the federal court on a constitutional
question, s38 the student must show that some right exists and has been
violated. 39 If successful, the school must bear a "substantial burden of
36. Id. at 101.
37. After discussing the details in the procedure followed in adopting the dress code, Judge Perry
said:
Minor plaintiffs simply refuse to comply, wanted the code repealed, and demanded that
school authorities readmit them in spite of the fact they were admittedly in violation and
defiance of the grooming provision. They, in effect, asked unequal protection of the law for
themselves, that a special exception be made for them, and that the code apply to all others
but not to them.
314 F. Supp. at 4-5. Other than the last statement, which is inconsistent with a demand that the code
be repealed, this is basically the same request made by plaintiffs in all long hair cases. It is identical
to the plea of plaintiff in Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. at 97-98.
38. Jurisdiction is generally admitted without controversy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1968). See
Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969); Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D.
Ala. 1967). Other sections frequently invoked include 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) & (4). In Crews v.
Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370, 1372 (S.D. Ind. 1969), jurisdiction was invoked unaer "Title 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1343(3) and (4), 2201 and 2202; Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 etseq.: 'The Civil Rights Act of
1964'; and the Constitution of the United States, more particularly the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments thereto." The only case to refuse jurisdiction
because of failure to exhaust state administrative and judicial remedies, was Schwartz v. Galveston
Independent School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970). The court there went into
considerable detail in discussing the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and held that § 1983
required complete exhaustion of all state remedies before it could be invoked to support federal
jurisdiction. The court abstained from accepting jurisdiction and made no determination on the
merits. Contra Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969). In Alexander v. Thompson, 313
F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970), the court granted the student an interim injunction on the merits
but abstained from making final judgment until the state courts could act, and reserved jurisdiction
in the case in the event it was not satisfied with the state courts' decision.
39. Many courts have not required this first step, placing the burden of justifying the regulation
immediately upon the school. The sole issue on appeal in Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (lst
Cir. 1970), was which party had the burden of proof. The school claimed that the student "had
failed to carry his burden of showing either that a fundamental right had been infringed or that
defendant had not been motivated by a legitimate school concern." Id. at 1282. Judge Coffin,
writing the unanimous opinion of the three judge panel, disagreed and held that the liberty in
question was within the "sphere of personal liberty" protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and "[I]n the absence of an inherent, self-evident justification on the face of
the rule, we conclude that the burden was on the defendant." Id. at 1286.
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justification"40 to uphold the regulation.' A formidable alternative for
the student is to claim that the regulation violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 2 Courts have come to contrary
conclusions on all three of these issues.
The student claims: (1) that his long hair is a form of expression and
emanates from and is protected by the first amendment; 3 (2) the fourth
amendment, combined with the first amendment, form a "vast
'penumbra' of constitutional protection," which makes free choice
regarding personal appearance a constitutional liberty;" (3) length of
hair and choice of clothing are within the scope of the right to privacy
40. This is the most frequently used description of the test determining the validity of the
regulation. It was first applied to hair cases in Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969)
and strongly supported on appeal in 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969) by Judge Kerner. The language is
adopted from Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
503 (1965).
41. The alternative to the "substantial burden of justification" test is a reasonableness test. See
Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Brownlee v. Bradley County,
Tennessee Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524
(E.D. La. 1967). Other tests have been applied which are similar to these two. See Sims v. Colfax
Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706
(D. Minn. 1969); Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966). The
various tests may in theory be different, but as applied to long hair it is very difficult to identify
distinguishing characteristics either in reasoning or result.
42. See, e.g., Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967); Miller v. Gillis, 315 F.
Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
43. The primary source for this argument is Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1968), where the Court declared that wearing armbands in protest of the war in
Vietnam was a form of "symbolic" expression protected by the first amendment. Quotations from
Tinker litter the pages of long hair cases in support of various student arguments, but one statement
by Justice Fortas has created a great deal of confusion: "The problem posed by the present case
does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or
deportment. [Citing Ferrell] Id. at 507-08. Some courts upholding the regulation have used this
statement to show Supreme Court approval of their decision and an acceptance of Ferrell. See, e.g.,
Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776, 780 (W.D. Mo. 1969). Other cases have
distinguished hair length from regulations on clothing, skirts, smoking, etc., because restrictions on
hair length "invades private life beyond the school jurisdiction," Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp.
706, 713 (D. Minn. 1969), and suggest the Supreme Court was merely limiting the issues involved in
Tinker. See, e.g., Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (D.Me. 1970).
44. This argument derives its source from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The
"penumbra" theory has attracted considerable attention in some decisions but no judge has held
that the right to free choice in personal grooming emanates from this source. See, e.g., Breen v.
Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969), affd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969); Richards v.
Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969), affd, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970). One student
contended that his expulsion from school for violating the regulation was cruel and unusual
punishment thus violating the eighth amendment. The contention was dismissed as being "wholly
without merit." Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524, 529 (E.D. La. 1967).
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and emanate from the ninth amendment. 45 If the liberty does not find its
source in the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, then (4) the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment itself supplies the source.46 A final and less frequently used
argument is that (5) the regulation creates an arbitrary class of
individuals and denies those individuals the equal protection of the law.4"
The school claims: (1) that the student has no right to appear in school
with an extreme hair style or outlandish appearance; 4s (2) the school
board is given authority by the state legislature to adopt any rules
necessary to maintain the smooth and orderly operation of the
educational process; 49 (3) questions involving school board authority
should be resolved on a non-constitutional basis;10 (4) the presence of
long haired boys in the school is a disruptive influence and the hair
regulation is reasonably designed to prevent those disturbances;5 (5) the
45. This is another Griswold argument based on Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion, 381
U.S. 479, 497 (1965) which is frequently raised and has received similar treatment to the
"penumbra" theory, see note 44 supra. Compare Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La.
1967), affd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969) with Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert,
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 62 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 1969), identified
Griswold as a case "involving somewhat similar issues ....
46. See Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Richards
v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (D. Me. 1970).
47. See, e.g., Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967); Miller v. Gillis, 315 F,
Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
48. This argument has received very little support and has fallen into disuse since Breen. Davis v.
Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524, 529 (E.D. La. 1967), affd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969), held that
"free choice of grooming" was not a fundamental right. The right is generally accepted to exist and
deserve protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Sims v.
Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485,488 (S.D. Iowa 1970).
49. School board authority to make rules and regulations is not subject to debate. State
legislatures have not involved themselves in the "long hair" controversy and, therefore, statutes
empowering school boards "to establish rules with respect to discipline" are not at issue. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 122, § 24-24 (1963).
50. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A NonconstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 373 (1969); 3 HARV. LEoAL
COMM. 1 (1966). See also Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d
468 (1965). This is generally agreed to, but where a person's constitutional rights are involved, the
nonconstitutional approach is inadequate. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1282 (1st Cir.
1970).
51. This argument, combined with the following one, has been by far the most effective for the
schools. See Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966), affd, 392 F.2d
697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968); Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La.
1967), affd, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969); Wood v. Alamo Heights Ind. School Dist., 308 F. Supp.
551 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Gfell v. Rickleman, 313 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Livingston v.
Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. I (N.D. IIl. 1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.,) cert. denied,
91 S. Ct. 55 (1970); Christmas v. El Reno Bd. of Educ., Ind. School Dist. No. 34, 313 F. Supp, 618
(W.D. Okla. 1970).https://openschol rship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss1/3
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regulation is reasonable, clear, applicable to all male students, and was
not arbitrarily applied to the plaintiff.52
Two judicial attitudes emerge. If the judge is convinced that personal
choice in grooming is in the nature of a fundamental right protected by
the fourteenth amendment, a substantial burden of showing a
compelling need for the regulation falls on the school. Once this standard
is established, it becomes very difficult for the school to meet its
requirement of justification. If, on the other hand, the judge accepts the
school's conviction that disturbances can be caused by non-conforming
student appearance, then the student faces the near impossible task of
showing that this liberty emanates from a constitutional source which
requires something greater than "reasonableness" as the test for
infringement. When the judge is convinced that the regulation is
reasonable and for a valid purpose, he is clearly within the bounds of
good faith when he holds this liberty not to be protected by the
Constitution, since the Supreme Court has not yet decided the issue.
These two factors should not be confused with the language of the cases.
The words and the tests are and have been used interchangeably. In
almost every case the fundamental attitude of the judge or judges toward
nonconforming youth and the schools as an arm of almighty government
comes through with unspoken clarity.53
The literature on the subject continues to grow.5 Student writers are
52. Cf. note 51 supra.
53. See Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (D. Me. 1970). The court had more difficulty with this
conflict than most because it was inclined to follow Breen and Richards on behalf of the student, but
the argument for the school was so different and so much more reasonable under the Breen-
Richards standard, that the judge found for the school even though his sympathies lay with the
student. See note 3 supra.
54. The law student commentary on the question supports the student's right to govern his own
appearance. See Comment, The Personal Appearance of Students-The Abuse of a Protected
Freedom. 20 ALA. L. Rav. 104 (1967); Note, SchoolStudent Dress and Appearance Regulations, 18
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 143 (1969); Comment, The Power of School Officials to Regulate Student
Appearance. 3 HARV. LEG. COMM. 1 (1966); Comment, Public Schools. Long Hair, and the
Constitution. 55 IowA L. REV. 707 (1970); Comment, Constitutional Law-A Student's Right to
Govern his Personal Appearance, 17 J. PuB. L. 151 (1968); Note, Constitutional Law-Public
School Authorities Regulating the Style of Student's Hair, 47 N.C.L. REV. 171 (1969); Note, A
Short History and Future Developments Regarding School Dress and Grooming Codes, 31 OHIO
ST. L.J. 351 (1970); Comment, A Re-evaluation of School Appearance Regulations: Is Free Choice
in Grooming Accorded Constitutional Protection?. 15 S.D.L. REV. 94 (1970); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Long Hair Bans in Public Schools, 4 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 338 (1970);
Note, Constitutional Law-High School Authorities' Power to Expel Students for Wearing Long
Hair, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 303; see generally Note, The Emerging Law of Students' Rights, 23 ARK.
L. REV. 619 (1970); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968);
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generally convinced that the "better reasoning" lies on the side of the
student, but the cases in no way indicate a trend in that direction.-5 The
appellate courts have failed to produce "better" thinking on the
problem and have been unable to set forth reasonable guidelines within
which consistency might be achieved."6 The Supreme Court, with
determination, has decided not to get involved at all.5" The judicial
Note, Public Secondary Education: Judicial Protection of Student Individuality, 42 S. CAL. L.
REv. 126 (1969).
The professional writers have discussed hair regulation problems within the broad spectrum of
student rights. See Abbott, Due Process and Secondary School Dismissals, 20 CAsE-W. REs. L.
REv. 378 (1969) (Expressly excludes discussion of the hair problem; supports application of con-
stitutional principles to students attending public schools.) Goldstein, Reflections on Developing
Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 612 (1970) (General discussion of the
development of the law of student rights with an emphasis on appearance regulation decisions.);
Haskell, Judicial Review of School Discipline, 21 CASE-W. REs. L. Rev. 211 (1970) (The
problem should be resolved by professional educators and the courts should stay out of it.)
Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished, 59 GEo. L.J. 37 (1970)
(Distinguishes Tinker from other student expression problems and suggests that all these problems
should be left to professional school administrators.); Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School
as an Educational Public Forum, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 278 (1970) (General
discussion of students' first amendment rights; expressly excludes discussion of personal appearance
problems.); Sweezy, Free Speech and the Student's Right to Govern his Personal Appearance, 7
OSGOODr HALL L.J. 293 (1969) (While there have been no cases on the question in Canada, the
author hopes the Canadian courts will uphold the student's right to govern his own appearance.);
Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (1969) (Discussion of the history,
substance and procedures involved in applying the Constitution to the total campus community.).
For discussions of related problems, see Comment, Dismissal of Public School Teacher Without
Prior Notification of Charges and a Hearing Which Affords the Opportunity to Present Evidence
Constitutes Deprivation of Due Process, 22 ALA. L. REv. 349 (1970) [Comment on Lucia v. Dug-
gan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969), where the court ordered that plaintiff teacher, who had been
fired for growing a beard, lie reinstated to his position]; Comment, Constitutional Law-Free
Speech Rights of School Children, 16 LOYOLA L. REv. 165 (1969-70) (Comment on Tinker and
general survey of first amendment problems.).
55. Of the thirty cases suveyed for this comment, seventeen held for the school and thirteen for
the student. Sixteen of the cases surveyed were decided in the district courts in 1970. In those cases,
ten held for the school and six held for the student. The district court decisions prior to 1970 were
evenly divided at seven each. The bulge in favor of the schools is not sufficient to indicate a trend,
but it certainly shows that the arguments presented in the legal commentary on the subject have not
been adopted by the courts. (For district court decision dates see note I supra).
56. See Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Davis v. Firment, 408
F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969); Richards v. Thurston, 424
F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.
1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist.,
425 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1970).
57. See Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968); Breen v. Kahl, cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1969); Stevenson v. Wheeler County Bd. of Educ., cert. denied, 9i S. Ct. 355
(1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, cert. denied, 91 S. Ct. 55 (1970). If the Court ever decides to hear the
issue, a sample of the range of opinions to be expected can he found by comparing portions of Mr.
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion when certiorari was denied in Ferrell with Mr. Justice Black's
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treatment of this issue is, indeed, an exercise in legal gobbledygook. It
may be that the schools will soon find their way out of "the first half of
the twentieth century,"8 and eliminate the problem before the Supreme
Court is compelled to resolve it. In the meantime, the absence of
reasonable Supreme Court guidelines for judges who, with increasing
frequency, are called upon to resolve the issue, is bringing about more
disruption and frustration in our nation's schools than "long hair" has
ever created.
vigorous dissent in Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525-26
(1969). Compare Douglas in Ferrell:
I suppose that a nation bent on turning out robots might insist that every male have a
crew cut and every female wear pigtails. But the ideas of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness," expressed in the Declaration of Independence, later found specific definition in
the Constitution itself, including of course Freedom of expression and a wide zone of privacy.
I had supposed those guarantees permitted idiosyncracies to flourish, especially when they
concern the image of one's personality and his philosophy toward government and his fellow
men. Municipalities furnish many services to their inhabitants; and I had supposed that it
would be an invidious discrimination to withhold fire protection, police protection, garbage
collection, health protection, and the like merely because a person was an off-beat, non-
conformist when it came to hair-do, and dress as well as to diet, race, religion, or his views on
Vietnam.
393 U.S. at 856, with Black in Tinker:
I. . 1, for one, am not fully persuaded that school pupils are wise enough, even with this
Court's expert help from Washington, to run the 23,390 public school systems in our 50
States. I wish, therefore, wholly to disclaim any purpose on my part to hold that the Federal
Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender control
of the American public school system to public school students. I dissent.
393 U.S. at 525-26. (Footnote to statistical source omitted.)
58. Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 451 (D. Mass. 1969) (Wyzanski, J.).
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